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"CLOSE RANKS": MAJOR JOEL
E. SPRINGARN AND THE TWO
SOULS OF DR. W. E. B. DUBOIS
of 1918. Racism had intensified during the war;
the Ku Klux Klan was on the rise once again, and the rituals of America's peculiar institution oflynching continued unchecked. The Amsterdam News reported that over 230 black Americans had been murdered
by mobs since the country had entered the war. I In July of the previous
year, the Afro-American community of East St. Louis had been taught
a vicious lesson in job competition by skilled and unskilled white labor.
(A similar letting of blood would traumatize an even greater number of
black communities during the aptly titled "Red Summer" of 1919.)
Public screenings of "Birth of a Nation," that cinematic landmark of
jaded artistic sensibility, only served to heighten the general lynchspirit of the age. Nonetheless, in the face of such atrocities, numerous
Afro-American doctors, nurses, and clerks responded enthusiastically
to the general, patriotic siren of wartime duty, only to be turned away
because of their color. Black soldiers, tempered with the will to extend
abroad a "democracy" which neither they nor past black generations
had ever experienced at home, complained bitterly of the treatment
they received at u.S. Army hands. (Emmett Scott, Booker T. Washington's former secretary, was appointed special assistant to Secretary
of War Newton Baker to "troubleshoot" such grivances as well as to
address the growing problem of black civilian morale.)
The general situation of black Americans was not particularly encouraging, to say the least. Yet, from one of the staunchest advocates
of Afro-American freedom there would emerge a curiously worded
call:
IT WAS THE SUMMER

Let us, while this war lasts, forget our special grievances and close
our ranks shoulder to shoulder with our own white fellow citizens
and the allied nations that are fighting for democracy. We make
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no ordinary sacrifice, but we make it gladly and willingly with our
eyes lifted to the skies.

The voice was that of William Edward Burghardt DuBois, in a lead
editorial appearing in the July 1918 Crisis magazine. Within the national black community, DuBois' quixotic advice was opposed by some,
supported by others. 2 From the pen of one of the Afro-American
"wartime radicals," however, the criticism was particularly acerbic
and penetrating. Hubert H. Harrison, head of the Liberty League of
Negro-Americans and a former Socalist Party member, was quick to
note that the Crisis editorial and a War Department captaincy recently
offered DuBois "fitted too well together as motive and self-interest." 3
Harrison noted, moreover, that the case had "its roots much farther
back than the editorial in July's Crisis." Months earlier the magazine
found itself under investigation by the Justice Department for alleged
seditious expression. Then in mid-June a conference of some thirty
or so black editors was called in Washington under the aegis of Emmett
Scott and Joel Springarn (the latter of which had recently been assigned
to military intelligence). DuBois was a prominent party to that conference, the details of which had been kept secret from the general
public. It seemed quite clear to Harrison that the apparent "servile
virtues of acquiescence and subservience" manifested in DuBois' editorial were hardly a "slip of the pen or a venal error in logic." Rather,
the
connection between the successive acts of the drama (May, June,
July) was too clear to admit of any interpretation other than that
of deliberate, cold-blooded, purposive planning. And the connection with Springarn seemed to suggest that personal friendships
and public faith were not good working teammates. 4

Although lacking specific details of the "drama" which he so unkindly
depicted, Hubert H. Harrison's charges proved to be rather incisive
in their overall characterization. Only in recent years have researchers,
working with declassified military documents, been in a position to confirm the essence of the "script" which Harrison envisioned behind
DuBois' call to "Close Ranks." Calculated planning on the part of
certain persons, there assuredly was; DuBois' performance, on the
other hand, seems to have been propelled more by extreme confusion
and naivete.
II

Joel E. Springarn, one of the early "movers" of the NAACP, had
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been promoted to the rank of major and given command of the 311 th
Infantry batallion during the war. Just prior to his being shipped to the
European front in the fall of 1917, Springarn suffered a severe ulcer
attack, requiring hospitalization. 5 Following recovery, he was assigned
a desk job with the Army's Military Intelligence Branch in the District
of Columbia, to which he reported on 27 May 1918. His duties: to carry
out intelligence activities with respect to mounting left-wing radicalism
in general, and Afro-American "subversive" tendencies in particular. 6
Major Springarn did not drag his feet; within several weeks' time following his appointment he had orga'nized a conference of editors and
other black middle-class leaders, lobbied for anti-lynch legislation in
Congress, and coaxed the Secretary of War into pressuring President
Woodrow Wilson to issue an anti-lynch declaration.
Several structural changes were proposed by Major Springarn in
regard to the MIB's handling of "Negro subversion" cases. One concerned the creation of a "separate and distinct section" of the branch
to deal specifically with all such matters; the other called for the creation of an "Advisory Committee to the Chief of Staff of the Army,"
whose apparent task would be to engage in counter-espionage activities
among Afro-Americans. 7 W. E. B. DuBois figured pr9minently in
Springarn's plan "of far-reaching constructive effort to satisfy the
pressing grievances of colored Americans.... "8 But could the latter's
proposal that DuBois be appointed head of such a committee be made
palatable to an intelligence community which, up to this moment, regarded him as a "dangerous radical?" On 10 June Springarn informed
a superior of a recent interview with Dr. DuBois, who had apparently
agreed that all materials considered for publication in the Crisis would
now be submitted in advance to a "designated person,"9 and that the
magazine would thereafter become "an organ of patriotic propaganda." 10 Now that the Crisis editor had apparently come to recognize
the pitfalls of his earlier militancy, Springarn's superiors were prepared
to grant him a captaincy in the War Department, which offer was privately tendered on 15 June. 1I The appointment set off a rather wellknown controversy within the NAACP: while its Board of Directors
generally concurred in the advisability of DuBois' accepting the military appointment, it was virtually unanimous in opposing his bid to
retain editorial control over the magazine. Its editor would be forced
to choose, in his words, "between devotion to his life work and duty
to his country in time of war." 12 As events unfolded, such a choice
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would prove unnecessary; but that is jumping a bit ahead of the narrative.
Black public outcry against lynching, bordering on what some
authorities considered to be "unpatriotic" expression in a time of war,
was a domestic "nuisance" which might well hinder prosecution of
U.S. war aims overseas. Though generally supportive of the use of black
troops to further the defined interests of the country abroad, the AfroAmerican press was nevertheless quite given to providing front-page
coverage to these almost daily atrocities committed against black
Americans. With support from what appears to have been only a handful of colleagues in the Military Intelligence Branch, Springarn understood full well that any unilateral attempt to suppress publication of
such stories, while at the same time allowing lynch mobs of white Americans to continue a favored pastime, would, at the very least, lead to
further disaffection within the Afro-American national community.
Consequently, Major Springarn, aided by Emmett Scott, evolved a
plan to appease the most prominent and powerful molders and shapers
of "black public opinion." On 5 June Scott and Springarn drafted 'a
letter to George Creel, chairman of the federal Committee on Public
Information, requesting that the Committee sponsor, "at an early date,"
a conference of approximately twenty Afro-American editors and
about "a dozen or so other influential leaders among the Negro
people...." 13 That three-day conference was convened in Washington,
D.C. on 19 June. The thirty-one persons in attendance included John
H. Murphy of the Baltimore Afro-American; Robert L. Vann, Pittsburgh Courier; Fred R. Moore, New York Age; Benjamin J. Davis,
Atlanta Independent; Robert R. Moton of Tuskegee Institute; Archibald H. Grimke, president of the Washington branch NAACP; P. B. S.
Pinchback, former governor of Louisiana; Kelly Miller, Howard
University dean; Robert S. Abbott of the Chicago Defender; and
W. E. B. DuBois. 14 When the conference opened Wednesday morning,
19 June, the overall atmosphere seemed calculated to play upon the
bourgeois sensibilities of black leaders in attendance. "To enliven the
occasion for the visitors," reported the New York Evening Post,
a local committee of citizens provided a series of entertainments,
which included, among other things, a theatre party of fifty at the
Howard Theatre, to witness the presentation of "The Divorce
Question" by the Quality Amusement Company, of New York
City; a smoker and luncheon in the assembly room of the 12th
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Street Y.M.e.A., with Attorney W. L. Houston as toastmaster;
and a tour of the city in sight-seeing automobiles, covering views
of the parks and public buildings, and the schools, churches, business houses and homes of colored Washington. IS

A galaxy of "prestigious" speakers was invited to address the conference: Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War; George Creel, Chairman of
the Committee on Pl;lblic Information; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Edward N. Hurley, Chairman of the U.S.
Shipping Board; as well as Major Springarn and his brother, Capt.
Arthur S. Springarn of the Medical Reserve Corps. Critical to any
discussion of the "controversial" treatment of Afro-American troops
overseas were the testimonies of Gen. Paul Vignal, Military Attache
of the French Embassy; and Majors Edouard Requin and L. P. Montal
of the French High Commission, who also attended. Emmett Scott
presided at all of the sessions. 16 "The general plan which Mr. Scott and
I had in mind," wrote Springarn to a superior the day following the
conference,
involved a general discussion on the part of all the conferees, so
as to permit each man to "let off steam" as much as he desired,
and then to guide the discussion in the right direction so that
unanimous action might be possible before the conference closed.1 7

The successful and unobtrusive "guidance" of Messrs. Scott and
Springarn resulted in the drafting of an address to the Committee on
Public Information. (See Appendix B.) Officially the conclusions of a
conference committee, the address was actually the handiwork of
W. E. B. DuBois. IS The document opened with an affirmation ofloyalty'
to the government, outlined in strong terms the principal grievances
of black Americans (lynching, the racist refusal of governmental and
private institutions to utilize their needed skills, and segregation in
travel), and closed with a plea for social reform in the name of justice
and wartime efficiency. Unfortunately, not a single word of the firmest
language in the document-that pertaining to the "justifiable grievances" of black Americans-was ever made public. First of all, it had
been agreed by conferees that a Bill of Particulars on which concrete
action might be taken by the government, would be submitted privately
to authorities. Second, there had been agreement as well that information concerning the nature and outcome of the conference would be
handled solely through the office of Emmett Scott.
As it turned out, however, the bulk of the proposals were simply
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ignored by the government; the first agreement therefore deprived the
conferees of any forum for mass agitation. As a result of the latter decision, the public version of the Address-as released by Scott through
the War Department-was stripped of any detailed reference to plaints
registered at the conference. The sanitized interpretation tilted more
towards expression of Afro-American loyalty than anything else. 19
But Major Springarn was pleased. He reported privately that
The conference, in my opinion, will have an excellent effect on the
colored press, and on the other leaders of the negro race. All were
pleased at having been taken into the confidence of the Government and asked for advice and co-operation. The list of grievances
which they submitted is on the whole a moderate one; nearly all
admit of immediate relief without any fundamental social readjustments; and it seems to me the part of military statesmanship to remedy as many of them as possible at this time. 2o

It would thus be unfair to characterize the conference overall simply
as a process of wining, dining, and ultimate compromising of black
middle-class leadership-although such machinations obviously
played a considerable role there. For behind the scenes Major Springarn was indeed working actively to introduce anti-lynch legislation in
Congress through Representative Leonidas Dyer;21 and through the
offices of Secretary of War Newton Baker, President Wilson was
urged to issue a statement condemning lynching, which declaration
came on 26 July.22 But Wilson's statement, rather than condemning
acts of lynching in the strongest of "anti-patriotic" terms, as Springarn
had requested to Baker, took the milder tack of urging white Americans
to adhere to standards of "law and order" of which the Germans were
purportedly bereft. 23 Ultimately, several versions of the Dyer bill went
down to defeat in the U.S. Congress;24 lacking any means of enforcement, President Wilson's call for civility was condemned to fall flat
on the impaired, racist ears of the nation. In effect, then, those prominent Afro-American editors attending the Springarn-Scott conference ended by trading whatever militant demands they may have hadparticularly those relating to the public murder of blacks-for shallow
promises. Believing that it had envisioned the rays of a new dawn, the
Indianapolis-based Freeman crowed:
For the first time in history the government at the National Capital
actually called into conference private citizens of the Colored
race and asked them what should be done to bring their people to a
closer and more effective participation in the working out of the
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salvation of the nation and the world....
. . . there was born of that gathering the splendid assurance that
the Colored man is no longer regarded in high places as a political
pawn, more or less necessary to the economic welfare of the
country....
Let us gird up our loins for the fray in the knowledge that God
reigns and that the government at Washington is and must be a
government of and for all the people!2 5

III

For two months the Army bureaucracy weighed Springarn's proposal to create an advisory committee to the General Staff, headed by
W. E. B. DuBois, the vague purpose of which was to carry out "counterespionage" activities among black Americans. The proposal was then
rejected, ostensibly on the grounds that "its broad scope might lead
'beyond the proper limits of military activity.' "26 What the decision
meant in practical terms was that the military would continue in its
surveillance of alleged "subversive" activities of Afro-Americans
within and without the armed forces, while essentially choosing to
ignore the underlying conditions which produced them. 27
Joel Springarn believed that his presence within the Military Intelligence Branch would somehow make a difference with respect to its
"racial" policies. What he would soon learn, however, was that his
penchant for social reform would soon lead to his being stripped of
domestic duties and assigned once again to the theater of war,28 With
the rendering of the Army's decision, DuBois found that he had placed
himself squarely "between a rock and a hard place," as black folk are
still fond of saying. He had satisfied no one-niether conservatives,
who evinced little interest in social reform, nor those of more progressive mien who felt compromise under existing circumstances to be a
disastrous policy. Despite claims of his critics, DuBois' patriotic retreat
from militancy during the war does not seem to have been the crass
result of Springarn's having dangled the alluring prospects of a captaincy before him. Rather, it appears to have arisen from a number of
factors, the most critical of which seems to have been thefragile ambivalence of DuBois' own ideological formulations, now pushed to the
Right under the weight of extreme political pressures. With criticism
refusing to subside, DuBois then sought to establish that his July editorial was "in exact accord and almost in the very same words of a
resolution written by the same hand and passed unanimously by the
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thirty-one editors of all the leading Negro publications in America." 29
But the sad truth was that while the editorial clearly sought to downplay the "special grievances" of black Americans for the purpose of
winning the war, the conference resolution called for a "minimum of
consideration" in this area in order to make the Negro an "efficient
fighter for victory." Both positions had indeed been penned by the
same, ambivalent hand. For the moment, at least, sheer strength alone
had failed to keep "two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings;
two warring ideals in one dark body" from tearing it asunder.

NOTES
I Amsterdam News (29 May 1918); copy in Record Group 165: Records of
the War Department General and Special Staffs; Entry 65; MID 10218-163
(National Archives). All other references to MID 10218 files refer to this same
record group. The editorial bears the style of Cyril V. Briggs, who was eventually dismissed from the paper for publishing militant editorials during the war.
2 See, for example, Crisis (September 1918),218-19.
3 Hubert H. Harrison, When Africa Awakes (New York: Porro Press, 1920),
68; a copy of Harrison's editorial can be found in Joanne Grant, Black Protest:
History, Documents, Analyses, 1619 to the Present (New York: Fawcett Publications, 1968), 185-87.
4 Ibid., 69-70.
5 Joyce Ross, J. E. Springarn and the Rise of the NAACP, 1911-1939 (New
York: Atheneum, 1973),97.
6 Judged by the content of extant military memoranda bearing on Springarn's
actions, the greatest portion of his time appears to have been expended in the
latter category.
7 See Appendix A.
8 Crisis (September 1918), 215.
9 The head of the NAACP's legal committee was indeed assigned to monitor
the contents of the Crisis prior to publication. To what extent this action was
primarily the result of Springarn's maneuvering or that of the NAACP's Board
of Directors, is difficult to determine. There is little doubt, however, that a
direct relationship existed between DuBois's subsequent "Close Ranks" editorial and pressures exerted by the Justice Department through his NAACP
colleagues. See Elliot Rudwick, W. E. B. DuBois: Propagandist of the Negro
Protest (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 202.
10 See Appendix A.
II Crisis (September 1918), 215.
12 Ibid., 216.
13 Scott and Springarn to Creel, 5 June 1918. MID 10218-154.
14 New York Evening Post, I July 1918; copy in MID 10218-154.
15 Ibid.
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Ibid.
Springarn to Churchill, 22 June 1918. MID 10218-154.
18 Springarn to Churchill, 22 June 1918.
19 Crisis (August 1918), 163-64.
20 Springarn to Churchill, 22 June 1918.
21 Springarn and one Capt. Hornblower appeared in fact before the Committee of the Judiciary on 6 June in support of such a bill; Hornblower apparently wrote the first draft of the initial bill which Dyer submitted to Congress.
Springarn to Churchill, 10 June 1918.
22 Newton Baker to Woodrow Wilson, 19 July 1918; MID 10218-154. Washington Post (27 July 1918); copy in MID 10218-154. New York Times (27 July
1918).
23 Committee on Public Information, 26 July 1918. MID 10218-154.
24 The second version passed the House in late January 1922; facing a filibuster in the Senate, the bill was dropped by the Republicans in caucus in
December of that same year. New York Times (27 January, 3 December 1922).
25 Freeman (6 July 1918); copy in MID 10218-154.
26 Crisis (September 1918), 216.
27 1 have not yet attempted an exhaustive survey of the period of time over
which military surveiIlance of Afro-American civilians persisted. However,
extant records indicate that Army intelligence operations directed toward such
organizations as the Universal Negro Improvement ASsociation continued
as late as 1921.
28 Ross, 10 I.
29 Crisis (September 1918),216.
16

17

APPENDIX A
EXECUTIVE DIVISION
MIUTARYINTELUGENCEBRANCH

In replying refer to
M.I.B. 10218-154
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
June 10, 1918
Memorandum for Colonel Churchill.
Subject: Negro Subversion.
I reported for duty in M.I.B. on May 27th and was assigned to work
on (1) Bolsheviki; I.W.W. etc., (2) Negro Subversion.
I immediately formulated the following program for work in Negro
Subversion:
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L Intelligence.
(a) Organization throughout the country of counter espionage system
among colored people themselves.
(b) Conference of thirty or forty colored editors and race leaders in
Washington.
(c) Letters to editors of the 200 colored papers and others, following
the conference.
(d) Increase and organization of colored intelligence officers throughout the U.S.
(e) Co-operation with Mr. Emmett Scott, Special Ass't to the Secretary of War.
II. Counter propaganda (to offset chief causes of colored disaffection).
(a) Passage of anti-lynching legislation in Congress.
(b) Address or proclamation by President indicating that (during the
war) lynching will be regarded as disloyal, and aiding the enemy, since
it causes disaffection among 12,000,000 people.
(c) Denial by Gen. Pershing of false reports of treatment of colored
troops abroad.
(d) Assignment of Col. Charles Young, U.S.A., retired, to active
service.
(e) Stimulating counter propaganda in the press through the Committee on Public Propaganda. (sic)
(f) Discouraging vicious anti-negro utterances in white press.
As illustrations of how this program is being carried out, the following
are mentioned.
1. A conference of colored editors and other colored leaders will be
held in Washington June 19-21. Their actual and necessary expenses
will be paid by the Committee on Public Information. (See copy of
letter signed by Mr. Scott and myself, enclosed.)
2. Lt. T. M. Gregory, 349th F.A. has applied for transfer to M.LB.,
and other Intelligence Officers will shortly be selected.
3. A bill, drafted by Capt. Hornblower at my suggestion (see enclosed
copy) was submitted to Representative Dyer, and at the request of the
Judiciary Committee, Capt. Hornblower and myself appeared before
it on June 6th and explained the necessity of such legislation. (With
approval of Col. Coxe and Capt. Hunt)
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4. Various suggestions have been made to Mr. Scott, which he has
agreed to carry out-for example, that a page of "plate matter" be
furnished weekly to the colored press.

5. Cablegrams be sent to 1.0., A.E.F., in regard to treatment of colored
troops.
6. Interview with Dr. DuBois, editor of chief colored magazine, "The
Crisis" (monthly circulation 70,000), who has promised(a) to submit all matter in magazine to designated person in advance
of publication, and(b) to make his paper an organ of patriotic propaganda hereafter.
7. Work begun on organization of counter espionage committee of
colored people ("Advisory Committee to the Chief of Staff of the
Army.")
The following recommendations are made:
(1) That Negro Subversion in all its forms be assigned to a separate

and distinct section of M.I.B.
(2) That the Secretary of War recommend the ·immediate passage of

anti-lynching legislation as a war measure.
(3) That the restoration of Col. Young to active service be given im-

mediate consideration.
(4) That the creation of an "Advisory Committee to the Chief of Staff

of the Army" be officially authorized.
(5) That the advisability, on military grounds, of an address or proc-

lamation by the President declaring lynching during the war to be disloyal be called to his attention by the Secretary of War.

J. E. Spingarn,
Major Inf. R. C.
Ene. 1
mcb.
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APPENDIX B
I. ADDRESS TO THE COMMITTEE ON

PUBLIC INFORMATION*
JUNE 21, 1918
We, the thirty-one representatives of the Negro press which has a
circulation of more than a million copies principally among the colored
people of America, and representatives of other racial activities, wish
to affirm, first of all, our unalterable belief that the defeat of the German
government and what it today represents is of paramount interest to
the welfare of the world in general and to our people in part~cular.
We deem it hardly necessary, in view of the untarnished record of
Negro Americans, to reaffirm our loyalty to Our Country and our
readiness to make every sacrifice to win this war. We wish, however,
as students and guides of public opinion among our people, to use our
every endeavor to keep these 12,000,000 people at the highest pitch,
not simply of passive loyalty, but of active, enthusiastic and selfsacrificing participation in the war.
We are not unmindful of the recognition of our American citizenship in the draft, of the appointment of colored officers, of the designation of colored advisors to the Government departments, and of
other indications of a broadened public opinion, nevertheless we believe
today that justifiable grievances of the colored people are producing
not disloyalty, but an amount of unrest and bitterness which even the
*Italics indicate unpublished sections of the original document. The version
printed in the August 1918 Crisis began with the words "We American Negroes
wish to affirm...."

best efforts of their leaders may not be able always to guide unless they
can have the active and sympathetic cooperation of the National and
State governments. German propaganda among us is powerless, but
the apparent indifference of our own Government may be dangerous.
First and foremost among these grievances is LYNCHING. Since
the entrance of the United States in this war, 71 Negroes have been
lynched, includingfour women, and over 178 have been victims ofmob
violence. The atrocities committed by American mobs during this time
have been among the worst known to civilized life, and yet not a single
person has been punished for lynching a Negro, nor have white mob

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs/vol3/iss1/4

12

Allen: "CLOSE RANKS": MAJOR JOEL E. SPINGARN AND THE TWO SOULS OF DR. W.

"Close Ranks": Maj. Spingarn & the Two Souls of Dr. DuBois

37

leaders anywhere been brought to adequate justice.
The effect of these facts upon the Negro people has been indescribably depressing, and we earnestly believe (and growing white southern
opinion is coming to believe), that Federal intervention to suppress
lynching is imperative. We urge a strong, clear word on lynchingfrom
the President of the United States, and then such legislation by Congress as will enable the Federal Government to go to the limit of the
Constitution, under its war powers and under its other powers, to stamp
out this custom which is not only holding our Nation up to just criticism, but is seriously affecting the morale of 12,000,000 Americans.
Secondly, -when American Negroes patriotically offer their services
to help win the war, these services are too often refused, or accepted
with reluctance, or with disconcerting discrimination. The Nation,
for instance, has asked for Physicians and Red Cross nurses, and has
accepted only a few colored physicians; the Civil Service officials are
advertising for skilled workers and for stenographers and clerks, but
successful colored applicants are repeatedly refused appointment on
the ground that they are colored; no colored men today can serve in
the Navy as able seamen, while in the Army no colored volunteers are
received outside of four regiments, and difficulties are put before
colored men and officers who seek training and promotion.
If the Nation wants our help, our help has been and will be offered,
but what shall we say or think when needed aid is refused?
Finally, attention is called to conditions of travel among colored
people. The railroads are now under United States control. Colored
people, just as their white fellows, are moving here and there, as soldiers
and workers. They feel, therefore, with special keenness the injustice
offirst-class fares and third-class accommodation and frequent other
embarrassing discriminations.
These are the pressing grievances which today are stirring ourpeople;
the American Negro does not expect to have the whole Negro problem
settled immediately; he is not seeking to hold-up a striving country
and a distracted world by pushing irrelevant personal grievances as a
price of loyalty; he is not disposed to catalogue, in this tremendous
crisis, all his complaints and disabilities; he is more than willing to do
his full share in helping to win the war for democracy and he expects
his full share of the fruits thereof;-but he is today compelled to ask for
that minimum of consideration which will enable him to be an efficient
fighter for victory, namely:
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(I) Better conditions of public travel
(2) The acceptance of help where help is needed regardless of the
color of the helper
(3) The immediate suppression of lynching
All these things are matters not simply of justice, but of National and
group efficiency; they are actions designed to still the natual unrest and
apprehension among one-eighth of our citizens so as to enable then
wholeheartedly and unselfishly to throw their every ounce of effort into
this mighty and righteous war.
II. BILL OF PARTICULARS,
TO BE SUBMITTED PRIVATELY
TO BUREAU HEADS IN WASHINGTON
A BILL OF PARTICULARS ON WHICH, IT IS SUGGESTED,
ACTION MIGHT BE TAKEN
(I) National legislation on lynching
(2) Colored Red Cross nurses
(3) Colored able seamen
(4) Colored volunteer .soldiers to the extent of their volunteering
(5) Colored physicians for colored troops
(6) Training of larger number of colored officers
(7) Unlimited promotion of colored officers according to proven
efficiency
(8) Utilizing the services of Colonel Charles Young (Retired)
(9) An attempt to equalize among black and white troops the proportion of draftees assigned to Stevedore regiments, service battalions, etc.
(10) Systematic getting and dissemination of news of Negro troops
at home and abroad
(II) Systematic attempt to correct ridiculous and (?) representation
of the Negro and omissions of his achievement in the white press
(12) The consideration of a Government loan to the Negro Republic
of Liberia, now actively aligned with the Allies
(13) Executive clemency for the Negro soldiers recently tried and
sentenced at Fort Sam Houston, Texas
(14) Condition of travel among colored people
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